Location-Based Services (LBSs) build upon geographic information to provide users with locationdependent functionalities. In such a context, it is particularly important that geographic locations claimed by users are the actual ones. Verification approaches proposed in the last few years are not satisfactory, as they depend on a centralized infrastructure that entails a high risk to the privacy of users.
Introduction
In recent years, an increasing number of Location-Based Services (LBSs) have been released, mostly because of the rapid expansion of the mobile device market. LBSs take advantage of geographic location to provide users with accurate and targeted information for locating friends on a map, discovering nearby social events, crowdsensing applications such as generating alerts about traffic jams along a route, and more.
To ensure that such services work properly, it is necessary that geographic locations claimed by users are factual. For example, LBSs with location-based access control that allow users to obtain a discount coupon, require that users cannot cheat on their position, to avoid delivering coupons to those who really did not deserve them. Similarly, social networks that enable users to discover where their friends are, work correctly only if geographic locations are certified.
The term proof-of-location refers to a method by which a system can confirm the geographic locations of users. In literature, different approaches to this topic have been investigated and proposed. Lenders et al. [1] presented a trusted computing module that ensures GPS data generated and transmitted by mobile devices. This solution is not acceptable inasmuch the trusted computer module would be expensive and difficult to adopt. Saroiu and Wolman [2] proposed a solution where users prove their geographic locations through a Wi-Fi infrastructure. Not even this approach is affordable, as it relies on a complex PKI infrastructure that needs to be deployed and maintained. Another solution introduced by Zhu and Cao [3] envisages a network infrastructure that provides proof-of-location of mobile devices equipped with Bluetooth. Although this solution appears effective and robust, its centralized architecture eases tracking of pseudonym-identified users by malicious administrators, whereas it might hinder the deployment of user-created location-based services.
With the objective of achieving a system that, at the same time, provides verification of geographic location of its users and ensures a high level of privacy to them, we have designed a completely decentralized proof-of-location mechanism for location-based peer-to-peer overlay schemes, such as Overdrive by Heep et al. [4] or ADGT by Brambilla et al. [5] .
The decentralized nature of peer-to-peer systems guarantees higher privacy levels, as it removes the central authority knowing both the geographic location of users and the information they exchange. To endow location-based peer-to-peer overlay schemes with proof-of-location, while preserving the decentralized approach, our protocol is based on the block chain [6, 7] , which is mostly known for being Bitcoin's core technology.
In the following, peer-to-peer network, overlay network, peer-to-peer overlay and network are equivalent expressions we use with reference to the same concept.
Block Chain Approach for Proof-of-Location
The block chain technology is a novel peer-to-peer approach, which allows to maintain a continuously-growing list of data records, linked in a way that makes them immutable. In general, a block is a set of one or more data records, prefaced by a block header and protected by a proof of some type. The initial and most widely known application of this technology is Bitcoin's public transaction ledger, a digital asset and a payment system invented by Satoshi Nakamoto [7] . The main feature that differentiates the block chain from all other distributed databases is its completely decentralized nature, which escapes the presence of a trusted central authority. Indeed, block chain maintenance is performed by a network of communicating nodes, which store their own copy of the block chain, validate transactions, add them to their copy of the block chain, and then broadcast block additions to other nodes. All these operations are performed in such a way that consensus emerges among network nodes, about the information stored in the block chain. We have adopted the block chain technology to endow networked nodes with the capability to verify and store geographic locations, not requiring a centralized super-node that oversees sensitive data of other nodes. In our approach, recent valid proofs-of-location are recorded into blocks, which are then added to the end of the chain and, once confirmed by consensus, they cannot be changed.
In particular, each peer i of the network is described by a unique id K pu i , which is also its public key. Moreover, every peer i is able to digitally sign messages with the private key K pr i associated with its id.
Block Chain Construction
Similarly to the solution proposed by Zhu and Cao [3] , peers can communicate with near nodes through any short-range communication technology, such as Bluetooth, Bluetooth SMART or ZigBee, and they periodically use these interfaces to broadcast proof-of-location requests and responses to their neighbors.
Supposing next block to be confirmed is Block t , a proof-of-location request contains the identifier of the peer that has produced it (i.e., K pu i ), the geographic location of the peer, and a hash of the preceding block in the block chain h(Block t−1 ). The request is signed with the requester's private key, so that anyone can verify that it has not been tampered with, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 A proof-of-location request produced and signed by the peer i for the peer j.
The peer that receives the proof-of-location request verifies its validity, according to the following rules: 1. the request has to come from a peer that, beyond being in touch through the short-range communication technology, is a known contact in the location-based peer-to-peer overlay scheme; 2. the request is digitally signed by the peer that has produced it; 3. the request contains an admissible geographic location, i.e., not further than the adopted maximum distance reachable with the short-range communication technology; 4. the request refers to the end block of the block chain; otherwise, peers start a synchronization process via the peer-to-peer network to align their block chains.
Once all checks have been fulfilled, a proof-of-location response is produced. The responding peer wraps the received request in a new message, together with its geographic location and identifier (i.e., its public key K pu j ). The proof-of-location response is also signed with the private key of the responding peer, as illustrated in Figure 3 . The response is verified in a similar way to the request: 1. the response comes from one of the peers to whom the request was sent; 2. the response is digitally signed by the peer that produced it; 3. the response contains an admissible geographic location, i.e., not further than the maximum distance that is reachable with the adopted short-range communication technology.
In case the response is correctly verified, it corresponds to a proof-of-location, attesting that two peers are geographically close to each other and specifying their geographic locations. Proofs-of-location are then broadcast to the network, which records them in the public record of all proofs-of-location, namely the block chain, after validating them. When a peer receives proofs-of-location related to peers that should be located nearby, it checks for their presence in the list of contacts provided by the peer-to-peer overlay. It is expected that geographic locations specified in proofs-of-location are reasonably close to each other, within the limits of the adopted short-range communication technology. If these constraints are not fulfilled, proofs-of-location are discarded and not disseminated within the network.
Every peer in the network puts all known valid unacknowledged proofs-of-location into a block, together with a reference to the previous valid block known to that peer. In addition to proofs-of-location and the reference to the preceding block, the block contains the identifier of the peer that generated it. Moreover, the block is signed with the private key of the peer that generated it, as shown in Figure 4 .
Figure 4 t-th block, produced and signed by the peer i.
Afterwards, the newly created block is broadcast to the peers of the network, which decide whether to add the block to the end of the block chain or not. If the majority of peers adds the block to the block chain then consensus is achieved, therefore proofs-of-location are made persistent. Otherwise, the block is discarded and not attached to the block chain.
Whereupon, it is verified that the hash of the referenced block matches the end block in the chain, otherwise a fork in the block chain occurs. Which one branch will become part of the main block chain depends on the distributed consensus algorithm explained below. Afterwards, the peer makes sure that proofs-of-location specified in the block are not already present in previous blocks of the block chain. In case a proof-of-location concerns the geographic location of the peer itself, it is checked that signatory peers of the proof-of-location are known (i.e., they belong to the contact list provided by the peer-to-peer overlay). If these conditions are not respected, the block is discarded, instead of being propagated into the network.
Distributed Consensus
Unlike Bitcoin, where distributed consensus is achieved by means of a proof-of-work technique, in our approach, a proof-of-stake mechanism is adopted, whereby next valid block in the block chain is the one produced (mined) by the peer that owns the majority of proofs-of-location in the latest T blocks of the block chain. In Bitcoin, peers are encouraged by the reward they earn to repeatedly run hashing algorithms to validate transactions. Conversely, our protocol does not require such an extremely time-consuming work, thus there is no reward for mined blocks, albeit it can be provided at the application layer. Therefore, in case a peer receives more than one valid block from its neighbors, it will add to the end of its block chain the one produced by the peer that has received the largest number of proofs-of-location, in the latest T blocks. Moreover, to prevent the monopoly problem, i.e., a peer that keeps out proofs-of-location that concern other peers from the block it produces with the purpose to remain the peer that owns the majority of proofs-of-location and, therefore, that takes control of the block chain, the protocol prevents that the same peer generates more than one block in the latest T blocks of the chain.
Remarkably, as distributed consensus is obtained according to information contained in the latest T blocks of the chain (2T to handle forks of the block chain), it is not necessary that every peer of the network handle all blocks of the block chain. The protocol works properly even if peers do not consider proofs-of-location contained in the blocks that precede the latest 2T , but only the identifier of the peer that has produced it and the reference to the previous block.
The value of T depends on the application layer. When it is important to store many past geographic locations, such as in applications for tracking and monitor vehicle fleets, T has a higher value, compared to applications that localize nearby friends. Forensic applications may be interested to store the whole block chain, in order to provide effective and trusted alibis for people under investigation. On the other hand, the lower is the value of T , the smaller is also the space occupied in memory. Therefore, the protocol is independent from the application layer and even versatile for the realization of different LBS types.
Protocol Analysis
We have analyzed the behavior of the proposed protocol, in case it is exposed to attacks that affect proof-of-location mechanisms, thus resulting to be particularly dangerous for LBSs [8] .
1. Cheating on own geographic location. A peer could attempt to fake its geographic location, specified in a proof-of-location request or response, in order to obtain a proofof-location attesting that its geographic location is different from the actual one. Our protocol prevents this kind of attack, since each peer that receives a proof location request or response, verifies that the specified geographic location is not further than the maximum distance reachable with the adopted short-range communication technology. 2. Cheating on another peer's geographic location. Another possible attack could hail from a peer that produces false claims about other peers' geographic locations. The protocol precludes such an attack, thanks to the asymmetric cryptography mechanism, whereby all the declarations concerning geographic locations stated by peers are digitally signed with their private keys and easily verifiable using their public keys that correspond to their identifiers.
3.
Replaying proofs-of-location. Proofs-of-location could be rebroadcast in the network by a malicious peer, with the purpose to forge its geographic location or that of other peers. Since every peer of the network checks that the proof-of-location is not already contained inside the block chain before retransmitting it, it is not possible to successfully complete this attack. Moreover, inasmuch every proof-of-location contains a reference to a block of the block chain, it is immediately discarded in case the referenced block is older that the latest T blocks of the block chain.
4.
Colluding with other peers. Another threat exists when two or more peers collude with each other to generate fake proofs-of-location. In literature, this kind of attack is denoted as Sybil attack and it happens when a malicious peer tries to prove itself in a geographic location that is not the actual one, with the help of another peer. Indeed, two peers could agree upon producing a proof-of-location attesting that their geographic locations are different from real ones, and broadcast it in the network.
Since our protocol relies on a location-based peer-to-peer protocol where peers expect to be directly connected, in the overlay network, with their geographic neighbors, colluding peers can be easily identified by means of the short-range communication technology. Moreover, it is unlikely that the whole list of neighbors provided by the peer-to-peer protocol is made of colluding peers. For the sake of precision, there are four possible situations:
a. Proof-of-location and location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay are equal and both fake. If a peer receives a proof-of-location concerning two other peers that claim to be close to it, it verifies that at least one of the two peers can be contacted with the short-range communication technology; if not, the proof-of-location is discarded.
b. Proof-of-location and location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay are different and both fake. If a peer receives from another peer a proof-of-location concerning the latter peer and related to a geographic location that is different from the one provided by the peer-to-peer overlay, such a proof-of-location is immediately discarded.
c. Proof-of-location is fake; the location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay is real. This situation is addressed in the same way of the previous one.
d. Proof-of-location is real; the location declared in the peer-to-peer overlay is fake. Also this case, which is probably the most intuitive, is resolved like the second one.
Hence, collusion is hindered by information provided by peers belonging to the locationbased peer-to-peer overlay.
5.
Determining real identity of peers. An attacker could attempt to determine the real identity of peers through full observation of proofs-of-location in the block chain. Actually, in our protocol there is no limit on the number of identifiers: in the same way as Bitcoin protocol allows the use of more than one receiving address, users of our protocol can freely decide to change their peer identifiers. As proved by Zhu and Cao [3] , if a peer has the possibility to periodically change its identifier according to a Poisson distribution, it gains unobservability and an attacker cannot determine the real identity of the peer by observing location proof records.
Thus, our protocol is shown to be robust against all major LBS-related attacks.
